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;
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)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah
Code Ann. and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that the cost to provide medical insurance

for the two minor children is the difference between the "employee plus one" dependent rate (the
couple rate) and the "employee plus two or more" dependents rate (the family rate)? The
standard of review for this issue is the clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846
P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that after July 1, 1994 (the effective date of

Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Ann.) Mr. Bradford could only deduct one-half of the
childrens' portion of the monthly medical insurance premium from his child support payment?
The standard of review for this issue is the de novo or correction of error standard. Saunders v.
1

Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991)(per curiam).
3.

Did the trial court err in awarding Mrs. Bradford a judgment against Mr.

Bradford for the difference between the amount of child support Mr. Bradford paid and the
amount he would have been required to pay had he not falsely represented to the court at the first
trial that the amount deducted from his paycheck for insurance was solely for the benefit of his
two minor children? The standard of review for this issue is the de novo or correction of error
standard. Saunders v. Sharp, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended);
The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. (A
copy of the entire §78-45-7.15 is attached hereto as Addendum 1).
STATEiMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff?Appellee Karen Marie Bradford Hogan (hereinafter referred to as "Mrs.
Bradford") married defendant/appellant William R. Bradford II (hereinafter referred to as "Mr.
Bradford") in 1986. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Bradford was a 33 year old electrical
engineer employed by Bechtel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Bechtel") on the
construction of the Intermountain Power Plant near Delta, Utah. Mrs. Bradford was an 18 year
old high school graduate. During the marriage two daughters were born to the parties. In 1991,
the parties divorced and a decree was entered pursuant to the terms of a stipulation. The Decree
of Divorce awarded Mrs. Bradford custody of the minor children and ordered Mr. Bradford to
pay child support in the amount of from $600.00 to $1,200.00 per month depending upon various
2
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scenarios regarding Mr. Bradford's employment. Prior to the divorce, Mr. Bradford had a
minimum income of $5,000.00 per month. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 82) (Pages of the Feb.
16, 1994 transcript cited in this brief are attached hereto as Addendum 2.)
In 1993, Mr. Bradford filed a petition to modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to
reduce his child support obligation due to a reduction of his income. Trial on the petition was
held February 16, 1994. At that time, Mr. Bradford was on "holding status" with his employer
and was receiving unemployment compensation. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 40) "Holding
status" meant that Mr. Bradford maintained his position with the company and eligibility for
benefits but was unemployed pending reassignment. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 14) The court
calculated the parties' 1993 income at $23,050.00 per year for Mr. Bradford and $6,000.00 per
year for Mrs. Bradford. The court found a material change of circumstances between the parties
and modified the child support obligation based on their 1993 income. (Transcript, Feb. 16,
1994 pp. 119, 120 and 126)
A significant issue at trial was the amount of the premium Mr. Bradford was
required to pay to provide health and medical insurance for the minor children. Mr. Bradford
testified that the premium amount was approximately $325.00 per month, and that the premium
provided insurance solely for the two minor children. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70)
Mr. Bradford testified that his insurance was provided by his employer for "free". (Transcript,
Feb. 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70) At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that although the
premium seemed excessive, Mr. Bradford could deduct the full amount of the premium from his
child support payment. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 124-25) The result was that Mr. Bradford's
3

monthly child support payment was reduced to $169.00 per month. (Order Modifying Judgment
and Decree, paragraph 5) The court retained jurisdiction of the child support issues and ordered
the parties within 30 days of any change in their employment status to prepare and serve an
affidavit attesting to the change. The affidavit would then be submitted to the court for
determination of a new child support order. (Order Modifying Judgment and Decree paragraph
3) The court issued its Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce on March 10, 1994.
Shortly after the trial, Mrs. Bradford became aware that just six days after the
trial, Mr. Bradford had become reemployed by Bechtel. Mrs. Bradford also learned for the first
time that Mr. Bradford had remarried in 1993 and had placed his wife on his medical insurance
in July of 1993. This revelation was in stark contrast to Mr. Bradford's testimony at trial. (See
Transcript February 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70) After learning of these facts, Mrs. Bradford on
March 21, 1994fileda Motion to Strike the Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
Thereafter, on or about April 20, 1994 Mr. Bradford filed a belated affidavit in which he
acknowledged his reemployment and the fact that his current wife had been enrolled on his
insurance.
An evidentiary hearing was held on Mrs. Bradford's Motion to Strike on
November 9, 1994. Not surprisingly, Mr. Bradford did not appear. He was however,
represented by counsel. The parties waived any objection to any procedural deficiencies and
acknowledged that the court could rule on the merits of the issues presented. (Transcript, Nov.
9, 1995 pp. 19-22) (pages of the Nov. 9, 1995 transcript cited in this brief are attached hereto as
Addendum 3.) The court received documentary evidence and extensive proffers of evidence by
4

counsel. The central issue at the second hearing was the calculation of the amount of the
insurance premium Mr. Bradford was required to pay to provide medical insurance for the minor
children.
The evidence produced at the second hearing was that Mr. Bradford's employer
offered insurance to its employees on a three tier premium schedule. There was one rate for an
employee only, another rate for an employee with one dependent ("the couple rate") and another
rate for an employee with two or more dependents ("the family rate"). (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994
pp. 4-5) (See also Affidavit of Defendant In Re Child Support Obligation paragraph 5 and
Exhibit A attached thereto attached hereto as Addendum 4.) The evidence also showed that in
addition to the minor children, Mr. Bradford and his current wife were enrolled on the insurance.
(Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994 pp. 4, 6, 27, 36 and 37)
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that the childrens' portion of the
insurance premium was the difference between the cost of purchasing insurance at the couple
rate and purchasing insurance at the family rate. Due a change in the law effective July 1, 1994
(Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann.), the court also ruled that after July 1, 1994 each party
was responsible for one-half the cost of the children's portion of the premiums paid. The court
ordered that prior to July 1, 1994, Mr. Bradford could deduct from his monthly child support
payment the full amount of the difference between the cost of the couple rate and the cost of the
family rate (which was $70.00 per month)1 and after July 1, 1994, one-half of the difference
1

There was some dispute regarding whether the difference was $65.20 or $78.67. The
parties eventually stipulated the amount to be $70.00. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, p.66 and Order
Amending Order Modifying Judgment)
5

between the couple rate and the family rate ($35.00). (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994 pp. 48, 54, 66,
74-75)
The court also awarded Mrs. Bradford judgment against Mr. Bradford in the
amount of $2,567.00 for child support arrearages that Mr. Bradford never paid but for which he
should have been ordered to pay had the court known at the February trial that Mr. Bradford's
premium payment included coverage for Mr. Bradford and his current wife. (Transcript, Nov. 9,
1994 pp. 64-67, 75 and 76)
Following the November hearing, the court signed its Order Amending Order
Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce on January 12, 1995. The Order was filed on
March 20, 1995 and is the Order from which Mr. Bradford takes his appeal. In overruling Mr.
Bradford's objection to the proposed order, the court, on January 19, 1995 issued a Ruling on
Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order which states in pertinent part:
The court has carefully considered the proposed Order and Defendant's Objection
to Proposed Order. The fact of the matter is that the second hearing in this case
was necessary because of defendant's [Mr. Bradford's] material
misrepresentations to the court under oath at the first hearing. Because defendant
was not present at the second hearing, the court was not able to inquire and
determine whether those material misrepresentations were occasioned through
negligence, gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive this court.
It is the position of this court that but for the misrepresentations and perhaps
deceit, the post-July 1994 hearing respecting these issues would not have been
necessary.
This court found, at the post-July hearing, through extensive proffer, that the
insurance arrangement of defendant with his employer was materially and
substantially different than that represented in the pre-July hearing. (The Ruling
is attached hereto as Addendum 5.)

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly found that the cost to provide medical insurance for the
two minor children is the difference between the cost to provide employee plus one dependent
coverage and employee plus two or more dependents coverage. The court'sfindingwas
supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. The trial court properly applied Secton
78-45-7.15(3) to the case after its effective date of July 1, 1994. The statute stands on its own
and is not dependent upon a change in the child support payment before being applicable.
Moreover, the November hearing was a mere continuation of the February trial in which the
court found a material change in the parties' circumstances allowing a modification of the
Decree. The trial court properly awarded Mrs. Bradford judgment against Mr. Bradford for the
arrearages Mr. Bradford would have been ordered to pay had he not misrepresented to the court
the cost of providing insurance to the minor children. As a result of Mr. Bradford's false
misrepresentations, he is estopped from receiving any relief on this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I. Mr. Bradford Has Failed To Marshall The Evidence
Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Ann. obligates the court in divorce cases to
"require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a
parent for the children's portion of insurance. Practical compliance with such an order is that
the parent ordered to maintain the insurance, if also obligated to pay child support, simply
deductsfromhis or her regular child support payments one-half the cost of the premium paid for
the childrens' portion of insurance. The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
7

calculating the amount of the insurance premium attributable to the minor children and thus the
amount Mr. Bradford could deduct from his monthly child support payment. That issue was an
issue of fact on which the trial court made a finding. Order Amending Order Modifying
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Finding No. 5. The court'sfindingwas made after the court
received evidence regarding the types of medical plans offered by Mr. Bradford's employer, the
costs of the various plans, the dates of coverage and the number of individuals covered on the
plan.
On appeal of a trial court'sfindingof fact, the appellant has the obligation to
marshall all evidence supporting thefindingand then to demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support thefindingwhen viewed in the light most favorable to the finding.
Gillmor v.Wright 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); Alta Indus. Ltd.. supra. 846 P.2d at 1286. If
the appellant fails to meet the burden of marshaling the evidence, the trial court's decision will
not be disturbed. M.; Pasker v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994).
Mr. Bradford has neither marshaled the evidence in this case nor has he shown
that viewing the evidence most favorable to the decision below the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the court's finding. The trial court's decision must be affirmed. IdH. The Court's Finding Regarding The Cost Of The Childrens'
Portion Of The Premium Was Correct
Mr. Bradford argues on appeal that because four people are insured on the policy
the trial court should have calculated the childrens' portion of the premium to be one-half its
cost. That argument may have merit if Bechtel had only one rate schedule. However, the
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evidence is undisputed that Bechtel has a three tier rate schedule. The schedule itself determines
the cost of the premium Mr. Bradford is required to pay for the two minor children. That amount
is $70.00. Calculation of a different amount would ignore the facts.
Moreover, any other amount would defy logic. Section 78-45-7.15(1) and (2)
empowers the trial court with broad discretion in assigning which party is required to provide
insurance for the minor children. Had the trial court ordered Mrs. Bradford to provide the
insurance, Mr. Bradford could only reduce his premium by $70.00 and still maintain coverage
for himself and his current wife. Under every reasonable analysis, the cost to insure the minor
children is $70.00. The courts finding that the childrens' portion of the insurance premium is the
difference between the couple rate and the family rate is not clearly erroneous. The court's
ruling should be affirmed. Gillmor. supra- 850 P.2d at 433.
Section 78-45-7.15(4) Utah Code Ann. does not change the analysis. As the trial
court correctly observed:
I would read that [Section 78-45-7.15(4)] specifically where you have a premium
that would involve a single person, and then you would have one that involves a
family situation.
Where you specifically have one that applies to a couple rate, and then you can
easily calculate the difference between a couple rate and a couple plus children,
then that seems to me to be in the best interest of the minor children to allow that
offset as opposed to a pro rata which I think is more applicable under a situation
where there's an indistinquishable amount, where there's no distinction between a
couple rate and a couple plus children. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 74-75)
Moreover, under Utah Law the court is required to consider the best interests of
the minor children, not only in determining custody, but also in determining other obligations of
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the parties. See Rosendahl v. Rosendahl. 876 P.2d 870 (Utah App. 1994). Likewise, the clear
intent of Section 78-45-7.15(1) and (2) is that insurance for the minor children should be
maintained by the party who can do so at the most reasonable cost. It cannot be disputed that the
interests of the minor children are better served by having more of the child support payment go
directly to the children rather than using the payment to purchase insurance for Mr. Bradford and
his current wife. Mr. Bradford should not be entitled to use child support funds to supplement
the purchase of his and his wife's insurance simply because the court ordered him rather than
Mrs. Bradford to provide insurance. The court was correct when it calculated the childrens'
portion of the insurance to be the difference between the couple rate and the family rate.

in. The Trial Court Properly Ruled That After July l, 1994
Mr. Bradford Could Qnly Deduct From
His Child Support Payment One-Half Of The

Cost Of The Children?' Portion Qf The insurance Premium
Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann., which requires divorced parties to share
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's
portion of insurance, became effective July 1, 1994. Prior to the enactment of §78-45-7.15(3)
the law allowed a parent to deduct from his or her child support payment thefiillamount of the
cost to provide medical insurance for the minor children. The court ruled at the February 16,
1994 trial that Mr. Bradford could deduct the full $325.00 premium paymentfromhis monthly
child support payment. At the November 9, 1994 hearing the court ruled that §78-45-7.15(3)
now applied to the case and ordered that Mr. Bradford could only deduct one-half of the
children's portion of the premium from his child support payment.
10

Mr. Bradford claims on appeal that Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann., does
not govern this case because that provision is somehow inseparably connected to the Utah Child
Support Guidelines which were also amended effective July 1, 1994. Mr. Bradford claims the
insurance provisions of the divorce decree can only be modified when there is a simultaneous
modification of the child support obligation. Because the Child Support Guidelines as amended
July 1, 1994 did not justify a 25% increase in the amount of child support Mr. Bradford was
required to pay, (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1995 p. 56) Mr. Bradford argues there was not a material
change of circumstances between the parties. He thus claims the decree cannot be modified to
reflect the new insurance requirements of Section 78-45-7.15(3).
Mr. Bradford's argument fails for two reasons. First, the Guidelines and the
insurance provisions are not inseparably connected but stand on their own. Nothing in the
express wording of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act precludes a court from enforcing
Section 78-45-7.15(3) in the absence of modification of a parties child support obligation.
Rather the express language of the statute requires the court to make such orders anytime the
issue is presented. Under Utah Law statutes are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary
meaning. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm.. 890 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1995). The issue
was presented to the court on November 9, 1994 and the court properly applied the statute.
Second, due to Mr. Bradford's false representations, the November 9, 1994
hearing was in substance a continuation of the February trial. At the February trial the court
found a substantial change in the parties' circumstances and allowed modification of the original
Decree of Divorce. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 119 and 120) The second hearing did not occur
11

because of a new petition to modify, but rather was required simply to rectify the mistakes of the
first trial brought on solely by Mr. Bradford's false representations. Thus, even if we assume,
arguendo, that §78-45-7.15(3) is only applicable when there is a material change in the parties'
circumstances, the finding by the court in February of a change of circumstances satisfied that
requirement. The mere fact the law was changed between the two hearings is the risk Mr.
Bradford took when he chose to deceive the court.
In Shelton v. Shelton. 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994) the court stated the well
established rule that:
A material misrepresentation or concealment of assets or financial condition as a
result of which alimony or property awarded is less or more than otherwise would
have been provided for is a proper ground for which the court may grant relief to
the party who was offended by such misrepresentation or concealment, absent
other equities such as latches or negligence.
See also Clissnld v. Clissold. 519 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1994) and Bnyra v Rovce. 609 P.2d 928,
931 (Utah 1980).
Mr. Bradford clearly misrepresented his financial condition and as a result his
child support obligation was less than it would have been had he not made such representations.
Mr. Bradford has no standing to complain about a court ruling necessitated solely because of his
inappropriate conduct
IV. The Court Properly Awarded Mrs. Bradford
Judgment For Child Support Arrearages
Without citing relevant authority or making logical argument Mr. Bradford also
claims the judgment for arreages was improper. Despite the attempted confusion, there is one
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fact that is certain. Had Mr. Bradford not misrepresented the facts regarding his insurance at the
February trial, the court would have made the proper child support order and the arreages would
not exist. Mr. Bradford cannot be heard to complain about having to make good on an obligation
he should not have been able to avoid in the first instance. JJL; Glover v. Glover. 242 P.2d 298
(Utah 1952).
V. Mr. Bradford Should Be Estopped Bv His Wrongful

Conduct From Obtaining Any Relief Qn Appeal
As previously addressed, material misrepresentations of a party's financial
condition in a court proceeding is proper grounds for a court to grant relief to the party offended
by the misrepresentations. Id, Aside from the fact Mr. Bradford's arguments on appeal fail for
lack of a legal or factual basis, Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations alone should preclude him
from receiving any relief in this appeal.
At the November hearing the trial court did not have the benefit of Mr. Bradford's
presence in order to determine whether Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations "were accompanied
through negligence, gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive [the] court".
Ruling on Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order. Neither did the court have the benefit of
the transcript from the first trial in order to determine whether Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations
were deliberate. As a result the court denied Mrs Bradford's claim for attorney's fees.
(Transcript Nov. 9, 1994 p. 67)
With the benefit of the transcript of the February trial the record is clear that Mr.
Bradford intentionally deceived the court. In response to questions posed by his counsel, Mr.

13

Bradford stated:
Q.

Do you believe that you'll be able to continue to maintain health insurance
and dental insurance on the girls?

A.

You bet.

Q.

How much does that cost you a month right now, do you know?

A.

Well, mine is free because I've been with the company. So what lam
paying is specifically for them. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994, p. 37)(emphasis
added)

Upon being shown Exhibit One which was a check stubfromhis employer, Mr.
Bradford was asked the following questions and gave the following responses to his counsel:
Q.
A.
Q.
A
Q.
A
Q.
A

Would you look at Exhibit No. 2 and just tell me briefly what that is?
This is a check stub for the pay period ending 30 January of 1994. And
really what this is, is my vacation hours on 39 and-a-half being paid to me,
and then deductions.
Did they deduct for health insurance and dental insurance?
Yes, they did. For Metropolitan, $875.42, and for dental $60.51.
It 's your testimony that these deductions then are to pay for the insurance
applicable only to your daughters?
That is correct.
Because yours is free? I meanf the company provides it as part ofyour
benefits.
The company provides mine. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994 p. 39)(emphasis
added)

Upon cross examination by Mrs. Bradford's counsel Mr. Bradford gave the
following responses to the following questions:
Q.
A

You've indicated that you cashed in your vacation time and paid how
many months premium for health insurance?
Three months until April 27.
14

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And the health and dental insurance, are you sure that's paid out of every
pay check or is that paid just once a month?
It's paid out of every pay check, every two week period.
And it's not — and you 're sure that no portion of that is for you?
I'm sure. Bechtel policy states if you've been with the company five
years or more, your insurance is paid for by them. That goes with
longevity with the company. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994 P. 70)(emphasis
added)

We now know based on the evidence presented at the November hearing that: (1)
Mr. Bradford's insurance was not free; and (2) the insurance premium he paid was not solely to
provide insurance for the minor children, but was also to purchase insurance for Mr. Bradford
and his current wife. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 4, 6, 27, 36 and 37) Because the
misrepresentations are so blatent, no other conclusion can be reached than Mr. Bradford willfully
lied. Such conduct should estop himfromreceiving any relief on this appeal.
The record is also clear that the court would have awarded Mrs. Bradford her
attorney's fees in the amount of $680.00 (Transcript Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 57, 67) had the court
known that Mr. Bradford willfully lied. Because it is now clearfromthe transcript that Mr.
Bradford did willfully lie, this court should award Mrs. Bradford her attorney's feesfromthe
previous hearings and her attorney's fees on appeal.2

2

The fact that Mrs. Bradford has not cross-appealed in this case for attorney's fees
should not preclude this court from awarding her fees. Donald Eyre, her counsel in the lower
court was appointed a District Court Judge and was required to withdraw as counsel. Mrs.
Bradford's new counsel was not retained until June of 1995 and of course did not learn of Mr.
Bradford's misrepresentations until reading the trasncript in preparation of this brief. Mr.
Bradford will not be prejudiced by the request for attorney's fees as he can respond to the
request in his Reply Brief.
15

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the trial courts' decision should be affirmed and plaintiff
appellee Karen Marie Bradford Hogan should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees at the
lower court and on appeal.
DATED this 18th day of January, 1996.

IVIN D BAGLEY

\

/ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of
Appellee to be mailed postage prepaid this 18th day of January, 1996 to the following:
Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.
Star Route Box 52
750 South Highway 99
Fillmore, UT 84631
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

521

JUDICIAL CODE

Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income

4,901
5,001
5,101
5,201
5,301 5,401 •
5,501 •
5,601 •
5,701 •
5,801 •
5,901 6,001 •
6,101 •
6,201 6,301 •
6,401 6,501 •
6,601 •
6,701 6,801 •
6,901 •
7,001 7,101 7,201 •
7,301 7,401 •
7,501 7,601 7,701 •
7,801 7,901 8,001 8,101 8,201 8,301 8,401 8,501 8,601 8,701 8,801 8,901 9,001 9,101 9,201 9,301 9,401 9,501 9,601 9,701 9,801 9,901 10,001 -

Monthly Adj.
Gross Income

Number of Children
3
4

2

lb

From

• 5,000
• 5,100
• 5,200
• 5,300
5,400
5,500
5,600
5,700
5,800
5,900
6,000
6,100
6,200
6,300
6,400
6,500
6,600
6,700
6,800
6,900
7,000
7,100
7,200
7,300
7,400
7,500
7,600
7,700
7,800
7,900
8,000
8,100
8,200
8,300
8,400
8,500
8,600
8,700
8,800
8,900
9,000
9,100
9,200
9,300
9,400
9,500
9,600
9,700
9,800
9,900
10,000
10,100

534
541
547
554
561
568
575
582
586
591
596
601
605
610
615
620
624
629
629
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728
732
737
741
746
750
755
759
763
768
772
777
781
786
790
795
799
803
808
812
817
821
826

1,002
1,015
1,028
1,042
1,055
1,068
1,081
1,093
1,103
1,112
1,122
1,131
1,141
1,150
1,159
1,169
1,178
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,189
1,197
1,205
1,213
1,220
1,228
1,236
1,244
1,252
1,259
1,267
1,275
1,283
1,291
1,298
1,306
1,314
1,322
1,330
1,337
1,345
1,353
1,361
1,369
1,376
1,384
1,392
1,400

1,226
1,245
1,264
1,282
1,300
1,317
1,335
1,351
1,367
1,383
1,398
1,414
1,430
1,445
1,461
1,480
1,495
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,520
l,53l
1,541
1,551
1,562
1,572
1,582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623
1,633
1,644
1,654
1,664
1,675
1,685
1,695
1,705
1,716
1,726
1,736
1,747
1,757
1,767
1,777
1,788
1,798
1,808

1,450
1,475
1,500
1,522
1,544
1,566
1,588
1,610
1,632
1,653
1,675
1,697
1,719
1,740
1,762
1,791
1,812
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,841
1,853
1,864
1,876
1,887
1,899
1,911
1,922
1,934
1,945
1,957
1,969
1,980
1,992
2,003
2,015
2,027
2,038
2,050
2,061

1,580
1,607
1,634
1,658
1,682
1,706
1,730
1,754
1,778
1,802
1,826
1,850
1,874
1,897
1,921
1,951
1,975
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
2,000
2,013
2,026
2,039
2,052
2,064
2,077
2,090
2,103
2,116
2,129
2,141
2,154
2,167
2,180
2,193
2,206
2,218
2,231
2,244
2,257
2,270

1,687
1,717
1,746
1,772
1,797
1,823'
1,848
1,874
1,899
1,925
1,950
1,976
2,001
2,026
2,052
2,084
2,109
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,137
2,150
2,164
2,178
2,192
2,206
2,220
2,234
2,247
2,261
2,275
2,289
2,303
2,317
2,330
2,344
2,358
2,372
2,386
2,400
2,414
2,427
2,441

LOW INCOME TABLE
(Obligor Parent Only)
Monthly Adj.
Gross Income

Number ofChildr en

From

Tb

650
676
701
726
751
776
801

675
700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
851 —
876 —
901 —

78-45-7.16

1

2

3

4

5

6

23
45
68
90
113

23
46
68
91
114
137
159
182
205
228
250

23
46
69
92
115
138
161
184
207
230
253

23
47
70
93
116
140
163
186
209
233
256

24
47
71
94
118
141
165
188

24
48
71
95
119
143
166
190
214
238
261

912

5
2o9

From

lb

926
951
976
1,001

— 950
— 975
— 1,000
— 1,050

Number of Children
3
4

276
299

279
302
326
372

5

282
306
329
376

285
309
333
380
1994

78-45-7.15. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical
expenses of the minor children be provided by a parent if it is
available at a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the
out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent
for the children's portion of insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita
share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for
the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium
amount by the number of persons covered under the policy
and multiplying the result by the number of children in the
instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent children.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide
verification of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the
dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent,
or the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar
days of the date he first knew or should have known of the
change.
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court,
a parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right
to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply
with Subsections (€) and (7).
199S
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent
share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses
of the parents.
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a
parent shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis
immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care
expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being incurred,
without obtaining a modification of the child support
order.
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a
parent who incurs child care expense shall provide
written verification of the cost and identity of a child
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Q

Okay.

Are you employed now?

A

I am employed by Bechtel Corporation, but I

am on holding status with that company.
Q

Would you explain that to the Court, what

that means.
A

Well, holding status means that the company

will continue to keep your resume active in their
files and constantly search the projects that they
have, submitting you to a project engineer to get you
on a j ob.
Q

Okay.

So you don't go to work every day then

A

That is correct.

Q

And I guess I need to ask you what your

now?

profession is, what kind of work you do?
A

I f m an electrical engineer.

Q

When did you first go to work then for

Bechtel?
A

I went to work -- let's see -- September

2 8th, 1981.
Q

And they have been your employer then since

that time?
A

That is correct.

Q

And as an electrical engineer?

A

That is correct.
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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Support Schedule would require you to pay under your
income status?
A

Oh, definitely.

Q

Whether you're unemployed or whether you are

employed?
A

Definitely.

Q

Do you believe that you'll be able to

continue to maintain health insurance and dental
insurance on the girls?
A

You bet.

Q

How much does that cost you a month right

now, do you know?
A
company.

Well, mine is free because I've been with the
So what I am paying is specifically for

them.
Q

Let me hand you a document here so we can

make sure that's a matter of record.
MR. ANDERSON:

I should have had these

marked, but I didn't get that done.
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Let me hand you what's

been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and ask if you
can identify this for the Court.
A

This is a check stub from Bechtel which is

telling all my deductions.
Q

Okay.

And that's for October of '93?

Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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A

That's correct.

A pay period ending 24

October of '93.
Q

And this basically would have been your last

payroll stub?
A

That's correct.

Q

Does that show an amount then deducted for

health care -- or health insurance and dental
insurance?
A

Dental is $9.06 and the Metropolitan 150 plan

is what I carry is 129.64.

And then I also carried

life insurance where the girls were the
co-beneficiaries on this policy.
Q

Are they still co-beneficiaries on the life

insurance?
A

Oh, yes.

And it was for 24.20.

Q

Now, that pay stub then is for a two-week

period; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

So your monthly cost for health insurance,

dental insurance, and life insurance would be
approximately twice that amount; is that correct?
A

That's correct.
MR. EYRE:
THE COURT:
MR. EYRE:

We'd offer No. 1, your Honor.
Any objection, counsel?
No.

Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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THE C O U R T :

It may be

(Defendant's

Exhibit

received.
1 received

into

evidence.)
Q
No.

(BY MR. A N D E R S O N )

W o u l d you look at

Exhibit

2 and just tell me briefly what that is.
A

This is a check stub for the pay

ending

30 January

of 1 9 9 4 .

period

And really what this is is

my v a c a t i o n h o u r s on 39 and-a-half

being paid to m e ,

and then d e d u c t i o n s .
Q

Did they deduct for h e a l t h

dental

Y e s , they did.

and for dental
Q

For M e t r o p o l i t a n , $ 8 7 5 . 4 2 ,

$60.51.

It's your testimony that these

then are to pay for the

deductions

insurance applicable only to

daughters?
A

That is c o r r e c t .

Q

Because yours

provides
A

is free?

I m e a n , the

company

it as p a r t of your b e n e f i t s .
The company p r o v i d e s m i n e .
MR. A N D E R S O N :
THE C O U R T :

this

and

insurance?

A

your

insurance

We'd offer Exhibit N o . 2.

C o u n s e l , do you wish to

examine

document?
MR. A N D E R S O N :

sorry.

I didn't

He has a copy of it.

show it to y o u .

Vonda B a s s e t t CSR, RPR
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MR. EYRE:
THE COURT:

No.
It may be received.

(Defendant's Exhibit 2 received into
evidence.)
MR. ANDERSON:

What I'd like to do is mark a

series of four documents, your Honor, if I could at
this time.

And it shows his unemployment income at

the present time.
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

marked as Exhibit No. 3.

I hand you what's been
If you'd look at them and

tell the Court what they are.
A

They're receipts from the Texas Unemployment

Commission showing a claim date and an amount for
unemployment insurance.
Q

What periods of time do these cover?

A

From 11 -- starting with 11-21-93 and going

through 1-9 of •94.
Q

And how much are they for?

What's the money

amount that results from these unemployment checks to
you?
A

Every two weeks it's $245 -- well, $490 every

two weeks, being $980 for a four-week period.
Q

Is that currently what you're living on,

Mr. Bradford?
A

That's correct.
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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A

Exactly.

I am pursuing work, as I've said

here in court.
Q

You've indicated that you cashed in your

vacation time and paid how many months premiums for
health

insurance?

A

Three months until April 27th.

Q

And the health and dental insurance, are you

sure that's paid out of every paycheck or is that paid
just once a month?
A

It's paid out of every paycheck, every

two-week period.
Q

And it's not —

and you're sure that no

portion of that is for you?
A

I'm sure.

Bechtel policy states if you've

been with the company five years or more, your
insurance is paid for by them.

That goes with

longevity with the company.
Q

Your wife has at no time prevented you from

visiting with your children; is that correct?
A

Oh, not at all.

Q

She permits you to have telephone visits

regularly; is that correct?
A

As long as I initiate them.

Q

And --

A

She has not let my -- she has not -- my
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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Q

Had you discussed the possibility of divorce

prior to that time?
A

Yes.

Q

He's testified that when he came home for

Easter break that year that you informed him of your
desire to have a divorce; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Did he agree to that?

A

At first he wanted to go -- he wanted to

fight it.

And then I talked to him and told him I

wanted to go uncontested, and he agreed.
Q

Did the two of you work out terms for that

divorce?
A

Yes.

Q

At that point in time were you handling the

finances for the family?
A

Yes.

Q

Approximately how much was Mr. Bradford's

take-home on a monthly basis prior to that time?
A

A minimum of 5,000 a month.

Q

And was some income for you -- was that a

concern for you at that time?
A

Yeah.

Q

And did the two of you discuss how much it

was going to require for you to live on and support
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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counsel or to this Court on a yearly basis their
earnings for that particular year and issues of child
care, if that is necessary, with some reasonable
expectation that there would be an indication at that
point in time rather than drawing them back from
Oregon or Nevada or Texas to recompute or reconsider?
MR. EYRE:

That's what I would prefer, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

I would prefer that, too.

I

don't want these parties back in this court every six
months every time their employment is modified, as
long as it can be reasonably substantiated for a
reasonable period of time.

We ought to be able to sit

down with the child support obligation worksheet and
make a determination what the obligations are.
I'm assuming that the defendant is going to
to become employed.

I hope.

And he hopes, I think,

too.
MR. BRADFORD:
THE COURT:

Amen.

Certainly, the children do, and

his ex-wife wants him to be employed.

We have at

least four or five different scenarios here because -is there a change of circumstances since the date of
the decree?

Certainly there is.

on the part of the plaintiff.
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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now as it relates to the part of the defendant.
There's some substantial period of time where
the plaintiff cohabited with another

individual.

And

if a portion of this was to be imputed as alimony,
then the Court might take that into

consideration

since August of 1992 through August of
did

'93 when she

remarry.
There are factors

involved

case that are s i g n i f i c a n t .

in this

particular

We need to make a

determination whether we're going to proceed

as of May

of 1993 with the reasonable expectation that that will
be periodically reviewed

automatically

upon presentment of child support

by the Court

obligation

worksheets from the p a r t i e s .
Whether that's every six months or it's once
a y e a r , whenever

it may be d o n e , so it can be modified

without the necessity

of t r a v e l , attorneys' fees,

c o s t s , and all of those t h i n g s .
MR. A N D E R S O N :

We certainly

agree with that.

There has to be some kind of a v e h i c l e , but there is
no problem with t h a t .
THE COURT:

I think that can work.

I think

that through counsel that we can do that without
extreme expense.

It can be supported

either by

affidavit and any work or employment paycheck stubs or

Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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MR. E Y R E :
THE C O U R T :
MR. E Y R E :
THE C O U R T :

Uh-huh.
P l u s 4 times $ 3 , 6 6 5 .
Uh-huh.
T a k e a m o m e n t , c o u n s e l , and

see whether we can r e a c h
MR. E Y R E :
THE C O U R T :
$50 of each o t h e r .
$23,050.

-- find out what that is.

$23,024 total divided by 12.
I show 2 3 , 0 8 4 , so we're
I'm

going to call his

for ten m o n t h s making

within

income

Her income of $11,000 minus child

obligations

let's

care

it $6,000 for her

income for 1 9 9 3 .
We can c a l c u l a t e then based upon the

child

support obligation w o r k s h e e t what obligation he has
from May of

'93 t h r o u g h the balance of

'93.

would be offset by his obligations on the
that he has f a i t h f u l l y

are severe

T h e r e m u s t be a way to reduce

MR. E Y R E :

then

insurance

paid.

And t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s
estimation.

That

in my
--

N o r m a l l y those are taken out on,

you k n o w , just one t i m e a m o n t h .
THE C O U R T :

W e l l , I want that to be verified

too because it is g e n e r a l l y
opposed to every two w e e k s .
MR. E Y R E :
to pay his life

And

as

And they seem high to m e .

clearly we are not

insurance

Vonda B a s s e t t

paid once a month

obligated

expense.
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MR. ANDERSON:

We haven't figured that in at

all, your Honor.
THE COURT:

But as to the health and the

dental, he may have an offset.
way to reduce those premiums?

But isn't there any
There must be a way.

At 100 or whatever it was, 139 every two weeks -MR. ANDERSON:

One hundred and twenty-nine

something.
THE COURT:

—

that seems excessive to me.

There must be a way, and I'm going to order him to
explore that and advise his counsel, and through his
counsel opposing counsel of the means by which he can
either increase the deductible or make legitimate
attempts to reduce the premium.
that already.

Maybe he's explored

I don't know, but I want him to.

MR. ANDERSON:

That's probably possible if

it's okay to reduce the quality, I guess, of the
insurance, in other words, the deductible.
THE COURT:

But at least through 1993 and to

date I'm going to allow the offsets upon verification
that's it's paid every two weeks.

And, counsel, you

can secure that easily, I think, those offsets of
those premiums towards whatever obligation it works
out on the child support obligation worksheet.
are we with each other so far?
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Agreed, your Honor.

Okay.

We've reached some terms

that you're both going to have to write down.
$23,050, and $6,000 for her.

We are on common basis

as it relates to the amount of the premium payments
which can be offset.

Working all of that through, we

will know what his obligations were from May of 1993
to date.
Now, next, visitation.
visitation in the summertime.

I'll allow six weeks
I truly anticipate that

the defendant is going to be able to upon reemployment
as electrical engineer, who is college graduated,
secure employment and bear the costs associated with
those six weeks.
I'll allow every other Christmas.

You can

work out the general schedule as it relates to that,
counsel.
I'll allow liberal visitation, liberal
telephonic visitation.

You can both work out the

details of that, what may be the best time each week
to call and with some reasonable anticipation that the
children can generate those calls, also, if they
choose to do so for whatever purpose, and to otherwise
keep the parties apprised of the development of their
children within the community, within school, within
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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of this year.

It was with respect to certain matters

concerning child support, visitation questions, and
those type of matters.

That resulted in an order

modifying judgment and decree of divorce that
Mr. Anderson prepared pursuant to the ruling of the
Court at that time.
Shortly after that particular hearing in
February, the plaintiff, Karen Hogan learned that
there were certain inaccuracies in the testimony of
Mr. Bradford at that time.

Those inaccuracies were

such to the effect that he did not have a job at that
time.

In fact, he flew directly from Fillmore -- from

Salt Lake to Maryland, and he had a job.

He testified

to the fact that the only individuals listed on his
insurance were his children other than himself which
was also an untruth.

He was married at the time and

had listed his current wife as a party on that
insurance.
Upon learning of those facts and receiving
Mr. Anderson's proposed order, I called him and
informed him of those facts and told him that based
upon that information we should modify that order to
reflect that the deduction for health insurance should
show the difference between an employee plus one
policy and an employee plus two policy since he had
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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listed his wife on the insurance, which was a
substantial difference.
Presently pursuant to Mr. Anderson's present
order, he is deducting $325 each month for insurance
which is the difference between a single and an
employee plus two.

If the deduction was for the

difference between an employee plus one and employee
plus two, the difference is only $78.67.
I pointed
discussion.

-hat out to Mr. Anderson.

We had a

And I don't think he disagreed with the

fact that Mr. Bradford had listed his wife on the
insurance, but there was some disagreement.

I also

wrote him a letter as a follow-up to our telephone
conversation.
I thereafter learned that he had submitted
that order to the Court and the Court has signed that
order.

Subsequently, he did submit an affidavit

indicating that, yes, he did have a job now and what
his income was and submitted a child support worksheet
pursuant to that new income.

And that shows a child

support obligation of Mr. Bradford of $673.
It's our position that he should receive a
deduction for his insurance premium only between the
plan for employee plus one and employee plus two, and
we agree that is $78.68.
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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THE COURT:

Can you advise me -- or,

Mr. Anderson, can you advise the Court when his
current wife was placed on that policy?
MR. ANDERSON:

Yes.

I think that's reflected

in the file, and it's reflected in the affidavit that
he filed, your Honor.
THE COURT:

I know it's subsequent to the

time -- at least from the affidavit it was subsequent
to the time that the two children were placed upon the
policy, but I can't recall the date.
MR. ANDERSON:

His present wife, Barbara

Bradford, was placed on the policy on July 19th of
1993, which was subsequent to him purchasing employee
plus two insurance plan after his two children were
enrolled.

Kristen, I think the way it said, was

enrolled on March 31st of '87, and Catelyn Bradford
was enrolled March 21st of '89.
THE COURT:
MR. EYRE:

Okay.
Okay.

Mr. Eyre, you may proceed.
It's our position that

Mrs. Bradford should be reimbursed retroactively for
child support based upon those amounts.

And we've

prepared a schedule which we indicate would be the
amount that she should be reimbursed.
THE COURT:

Is that the newest schedule that

this Court is obligated to follow, counsel, as of -Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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Court's -- or the divorce decree should be changed.
THE COURT:

Well, what if I agree with you,

counsel, as it relates to the procedure but indicate
to you that my understanding of the law, and certainly
I would have some discretion as it relates to that, is
that I signed an order dated March the 10th of 1994
when I did not have full facts.
It was either not disclosed to me or
intentionally misrepresented or your client was
confused as it related to that or he simply didn't
tell the whole truth because he didn't deem that he
should tell the whole truth or he didn't think that it
had any bearing —

substantive bearing upon the

decision of the Court.
Now, I can do a couple of things, I suspect,
as it relates to procedure.

If you make your motion

that this is not properly before the Court, I can
agree to that and strike it from the calendar today,
but it's going to be back.
If you want it back, you've got it back.

But

there's going to be a motion or a petition for a
modification.

It's going to be squarely back before

the Court.
What is in the best interest of these parties
as it relates to costs, attorneys' fees, cost of your
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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client to fly out from wherever he is now?

Is he in

Texas or is he in the midwest or where is he?
MR. A N D E R S O N :
THE COURT:

He's in Maryland.

He can assume also all of those

costs.
I'll tell you what I'm

going to do.

I signed

an order without all of the facts coming before m e .
And I don't know whether your client was confused, but
at least there was not a representation

of all of the

facts before m e .
I signed an order based upon the fact that
two children were placed upon the insurance
He was entitled

policy.

at that point in time to have

offset against child support.

When you talk about who

may gain from t h i s , it isn't M r s . Hogan.
to be the children

that

It happens

involved.

And this Court happens to have the duty as it
relates to the best interest of the minor

children.

It doesn't become a windfall to M r s . Hogan.
becomes what is legitimately

It

owed to the minor

children.
You can come back —

we can either

stipulate

as it relates to the issues before the Court, and we
can proceed and have an order; or we can come

back

with a petition to m o d i f y .

order

But I signed that
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without all of the facts.

I don't know whether it was

deliberate or not as it relates to your client.
But I may call him back here to make that
determination to see whether he deliberately misled
the Court or whether he was confused or he simply
didn't tell the whole story.

And then I can do that

on my own, and that may cost him a significant amount
to fly out here on the Court's own motion to determine
whether he's in contempt of court on a very, very
critical and crucial issue before the. Court.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Well, my client --

The best scenario is that he did

not tell the whole story.

That's the best scenario

you can paint for your client because he may have been
misleading.

He may have been confused.

I don't know

that.
But where do we go procedurally?

If I grant

your motion as it relates to the fact that are
procedurally before the Court, it may be defective,
but we're going to be right back here in about two
months.
MR. ANDERSON:

I don't disagree with that,

and maybe the Court misunderstood me.

And my client

certainly wants to get it resolved today if it can be
done.

And I'm not attempting to side track the
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR
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issues -- the real issues in the matter by bring:ng
that procedural point up with the Court.
What I'm trying to do is focus in on the
question that the Court answered at the very first,
and that is what are the issues before the Court.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. ANDERSON:

And I thought that was

important that w^. understand just why we're hear today
particularly in light of Mr. Eyre asking for increased
child support based on facts that have occurred that
are really not raised in his petition.

His petition

is simply one to set aside the March 10th order.
And I want to talk just a minute about the
telephone call we had because I think that's
important.

Again, we're talking about a lot of fluid

facts that come flowing along in a situation that kind
of confused it.

At least it's confused me.

But the issue of the phone call, as I recall
it, was that somewhere along in here Mrs. Hogan's
husband was employed down in the St. George area, and
he had insurance available to him that would cover the
children through his employment.

And it was going to

cost a lot less money than what Mr. Bradford was
deducting from his child support.
it was less money.

Right or wrong, but

So they had requested --
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It finally m a d e a big c i r c l e .

And hopefully

I'm

trying to bring the Court up to date as to what had
happened.
N o w , M r . Bradford does not object to the
Court u n d e r s t a n d i n g

and taking

today that his wife Barbara

into

consideration

is listed on his

plus two i n s u r a n c e policy t h r o u g h his
because

she i s .

employee

employment

As I said, she was put on there in

July of 1 9 9 3 .
Mr. Bradford's position

is that that

doesn't

m a t t e r because that's just a f e a t u r e , that's just the
character

of the program that's offered to him.

He

can put as many on there as he w a n t s t o .
THE C O U R T :

C o u n s e l , let's explore

that

reasoning.
MR. E Y R E :

Could I just comment on t h a t , your

Honor?
THE C O U R T :
position

It seems to me if that is the

of y o u r c l i e n t , it's w e l l articulated.

what you have

But

is two minor c h i l d r e n paying for the

insurance of their father's new w i f e .
MR. A N D E R S O N :
question

of who

And it just comes back to the

is entitled to that w i n d f a l l , I guess.

THE C O U R T :
MR. E Y R E :

And

if y o u can --

The c h i l d r e n
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he was required to m a k e an election between

other

plans.
It added

in place of $150 deductible

what he calls probably
plan.

-- oh, it's the Aetna

plan
managed

And this is an HMO type plan where there is no

deductible.
plaintiff

And this is the plan that he advised

the

and counsel that he intends to elect for the

children this coming y e a r , going into effect

January

first.
It, a g a i n , would be an expensive plan.
A l t h o u g h , as the Court can see from some of the other
e x h i b i t s , it's quite a lot less than it was last year.
It's just an H M O , but there is no deductible which
an advantage to the p l a i n t i f f .
co-pay, and that's a l l .
covered.
update.

is

There is a $10 a visit

O t h e r w i s e , everything else is

And that's a significant point in the

1995

Again, it describes what the benefits are.
THE C O U R T :

Any objection, counsel, the Court

receiving Defendant's
MR. E Y R E :

Exhibit N o . 3?

To the extent that this is going

to be an ongoing order, I think the rates for that
particular plan selected

for 1995 are similar.

There's e m p l o y e e , employee plus one, employee plus two
plan.

It would still be our position that based

those r a t e s , the difference

upon

in those ought to be the
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difference between the employee plus one and employee
plus two.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Exhibit No. 4 --

Okay.

The record ought to

reflect that I've received it with that objection.

It

may be received.
(Defendant's Exhibit 3 received into
evidence.)
MR. ANDERSON:

Exhibit No. 4 is

Mr. Bradford's action plan they call it.

It's his

update of his insurance coverage or his requested
insurance coverage.
It's significant because it shows that the
people listed on his insurance now is his two
daughters, Catelyn and Kristen and his wife Barbara.
They did have —
twice.

they had Catelyn listed

And that's what he's done is amended that and

turned it in.
THE COURT:

Any objection to the Court

receiving Defendant's proposed Exhibit No. 4
MR. EYRE:
THE COURT:

No.
It may be received.

(Defendant's Exhibit 4 received into
evidence.)
MR. ANDERSON:

Exhibit No. 5 is the price or
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percent?
MR. E Y R E :

Not with respect to health

insurance d e d u c t i o n s .
THE C O U R T :

And that's my thinking

also,

counsel, is that health deductions may in fact be
automatic at any time the matter is properly

before

the Court, that the Court has an affirmative duty when
a matter

is properly before the Court to take it into

account and must take it into account, and no new
order or modify decree can go into effect unless
provision has been provided

that

for within the proposed

order•
That's my understanding

of it.

Now, you can

clarify that for m e .
MR. A N D E R S O N :

W e l l , I understand what the

Court is saying.
THE C O U R T :

I think the legislature

says the

Court has the a f f i r m a t i v e duty, and no decree in fact
will enter until that has been complied with.
there's an affidavit
been complied

in the file that indicates

that's

with.

MR. A N D E R S O N :

The problem that I have with

that is that the m e d ; c a l expense statute
is intertwined

And

and inseparable

support s c h e d u l e s .

because

78-45-17.15

from the new child

if you read that, and
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THE COURT:

Whatever the amount is she would

have an -- whatever this Court determines is the
legitimate amount for him to offset on a monthly
basis, she has a one-half obligation of that.

And if

it's several hundred dollars a month, she has one-half
of that obligation.

And if it's $78.67 per month, she

has one-half of that obligation.
MR. ANDERSON:

If the new statute is

applicable.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's see.

Do you have

any other exhibits?
MR. EYRE:

Plaintiff's Exhibits 12 and 13

just show the wife was on the policy as of the date of
our hearing.

And Exhibit 14 shows what the premiums

are currently for the Met Life 150 plan.
THE COURT:

Mr. Anderson, do you have any

objection to the Court receiving Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 12, No. 13 and No. 14?
MR. ANDERSON:

I wasn't paying that much

attention.
THE COURT:

Take a look at those and see if

you have a question regarding the relevancy.
MR. ANDERSON:

I don't have any objection.

I

think that some of them are outdated, for example, the
one showing Catelyn twice.
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He didn't even know she was on there.

And

the one action plan sheet that I handed the Court,
Exhibit No -- I can't remember -- that's listing who
is on there now.

She's not listed because he made

sure that her name was taken off the record even
though she wasn't illegible for insurance anyway.
THE COURT:

Counsel, tell me if I were to

adopt the position of Mr. Eyre that as of July 1 of
1994 that the defendant and the plaintiff are to
assume -- each to assume one-half of the costs, that
really doesn't effect the child support obligation.
It simply would indicate an obligation that your
client may have back to the defendant and what he can
legitimately offset against his child support
obligation; right?
MR. EYRE:

That's correct.

We reviewed the

statute with respect to possible use of new
guidelines.

Under the new guidelines his child

support obligation would be $789 based upon his
current income rather than the 673.

And my

calculation is that's not quite 25 percent.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything further because

I'm going to take a short recess and review these
documents in chambers and then rule from the bench.
It seems to me, counsel, this has been
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080
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somewhat of a different kind hearing because the
defendant is not present and Mr. Anderson has had to
reply to the questions of the Court, and there hasn't
been any opportunity for cross-examination by
Mr- Eyre.
And so we've approached it that way rather
than continue it at tremendous costs to all of the
parties.

We simply want to get all the matters before

the Court, the facts before the Court, your arguments
as it relates to the law, and for this Court to make a
decision.
MR. EYRE:

The only additional evidence we

would proffer is just as to attorney's fees as to this
matter.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You may be heard as it

relates to that.
MR. EYRE:

Your Honor, since our hearing in

February, I've expended eight hours on this particular
case.

My regular hourly rate is $85, and we're

requesting attorney's fees of $680.
THE COURT:
address that?

Mr. Anderson, do you wish to

That appears to me to be a reasonable

in terms of the number of hours and reasonable as it
relates to the hourly wage.
it is an issue of law —

Whether he's entitled to

and you've addressed that
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With tha t background -- and I don 't know
whe ther a motion to strike is the appropriate document
!

t o

get all of the matters or issues before the Court,

but it appears to me that it's as satisfac tory as any.
The other is simp ly a petition to modify b ased upon
new evidence.
This Court in its previous hearin g simply
wou Id never have ruled tha t the defendant is entitled
to an offset of h is entire premium of insurance
against his oblig ations for child support had this

(

Court been aware that the defendant also h ad his wife,
his new wife, on that policy.
I don't know from the hearing how that fact
got away from us.

It was either the fact that the

Court was misled deliberat ely or misled ne gligently or
the defendant was confused or he misinterp reted or he
was mistaken or h e did not tell the whole truth or
there was simply a failur

to disclose or he wasn f t

ask ed the appropriate gues tions that would have
resulted in his response t o that question.
I don't know the answer to that q uestion.
But this Court ultimately did not make an order having
bef ore it all of the facts , regardless.
I think that any time the Court h as before it
directly an issue. that deaIs with the appropriate
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(801)

429-1080

|

65
offset of medical and dental premiums, then it can
under the new legislation that went into effect as of
July 1 of 1994 incorporate any ruling and rely upon
that statute.

Clearly the issue before this Court is

the appropriateness of the offset of the amounts
involved.
I think I indicated at the pretrial, which
was a conference call, that I believe that the
defendant was entitled to offset the difference
between the employee number one, the couple rate, and
the employee number two, which is the couple plus the
children, and that I would reserve my judgment until
hearing —

until I had all of the facts before me and

could review policies and the best arguments before
the Court.
I've done that.

And I don't think there's

anything that would indicate that I ought to depart
from that judgment.

What I'm going to do is modify

the decree or modify the order of March the 10th so
it's an amended order that would reflect that he's
entitled -- the defendant is entitled to an offset of
the difference between what is now employee number
one, the couple rate, and the employee number two or
plus two which is the couple plus children rate.
I don't know what that difference is, but it
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ranges somewhere between $65.20 and $78.67.

And I

think the defendant is prepared to stipulate at least
in closing argument that it is $65.20.
Now, next what to do as it relates to the new
statute.

I believe it ought to apply.

What's clearly

before the Court is what is appropriately offset
against the child support obligations, and that's
clearly the intent here of the statute once there's a
reconsideration of that.
And I'll exercise my discretion and pronounce
it that I believe that he is then entitled as of July
1 of 1994 to an offset of one-half of the difference
between the employee number one and employee number
two premium payments which I would think would be
one-half of $65.20.
By stating thdt I also obligate the plaintiff
in a monthly basis of one-half of that amount.
One-half of $65.20 is owed on a monthly basis or
whatever amount that may be between a couple rate and
a couple plus children rate.
Now, I f m not persuaded that a pro rata
fashion is in the best interest of justice, nor am I
persuaded that these children ought to in any form or
fashion pay the obligations or premiums of their
father nor, heaven forbid, the obligations or premiums
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of his new w i f e .

I could never reach that

Now, what the delinquencies

are, counsel,

will be based upon this ruling together
Plaintiff's

Exhibit N o . 11.

make those c a l c u l a t i o n s
those c a l c u l a t i o n s
order

I'm

with

not prepared

to

from the bench, but I think

can be made based upon this

Court's

today.
I'm

not going to find him

court because that
the oversight
the very

or the failure to disclose has

fact that we are back here

find him

in contempt

caused

today.

that to be d e l i b e r a t e , then I

in contempt of c o u r t , assess all costs,

and perhaps have him held

in the Millard

County

to remind him that he has the o b l i g a t i o n s .
can't reach t h a t .

Jail

But I

I don't know what his motives w e r e .

So in light of the fact that I'm
assess motives

of

issue is not before the Court, but

If I found
would

And

conclusion.

and he's not p r e s e n t today

not able to
for the

Court to make some enquiry relative to that, the
parties will each assume their own attorney's
relative to this
Now,

matter.

in a d d i t i o n , the parties have

that the p l a i n t i f f
insurance

company

is entitled

through

stipulated

whatever

the defendant may employ ro be

provided with d o c u m e n t a t i o n

Vonda

fees

Bassett

regarding

CSR, RPR

(801)

issues of

429-1080

74
says, "The premium

expense for the children shall be

calculated by d i v i d i n g the premium amount by the
number of persons covered under the policy

and

multiplying the r e r u l t s by the number of children

in

the instance c a s e . "
That's a pro rata.

And if if we're going to

follow and use the new statute, then we need to follow
that formula w h i c h

is pro rata.

And which

different than just using the difference

between

employee plus one and employee plus two.
significant d i f f e r e n c e
THE C O U R T :

would

It makes a

in dollars.

It does.

read that specifically

is entirely

But, counsel, I would

where you have a premium

that

involve a single person, and then you would

one that involves a family

situation.

Where you specifically have one that
to a couple r a t e , and then you can easily
the difference b e t w e e n

have

applies

calculate

a couple rate and a couple plus

children, then that seems to me to be in the best
interest of the m i n o r children to allow that offset as
opposed to a pro rata which

I think

under a situation w h e r e there's an

is more

applicable

indistinguishable

amount, where t h e r e ' s no distinction between a couple
rate and a couple p l u s

children.

I think that that legitimately
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1

you have a s i n g l e rate and then you have a family

2

rate.

3

that second p r e m i u m , then you p r o r a t e

4

don't have any b a s i s upon which you could

5

determine

6

And

if t h e w i f e or other children are under
it because you
otherwise

it.
But w h e r e you have the ability to make a

7

specific c a l c u l a t i o n between a couple rate and a

8

couple plus c h i l d r e n , then it seems to me that

9

r e a s o n a b l e to apply that f o r m u l a , the

10

between the two r a t e s .

11

Okay.

12

Anything

MR. E Y R E :

14

THE C O U R T :

16

from

difference

Plaintiff's

p e r s p e c t i v e , c o u n s e l o r , at all?

13

15

further

it's

No.
Anything

defendant's perspective,
MR. A N D E R S O N :

further

from the

counsel?
If t h e r e ' s going to be a

17

deficiency

18

that's paid, or is that just s u d d e n death as far as

19

the d e f e n d a n t

20

o w e d , can we address the issue of how

is concerned, or

THE C O U R T :

what?

W e l l , if t h e r e

is a calculated

21

deficiency u n d e r the order of the C o u r t , how do you

22

wish to address t h a t ,

23

MR. E Y R E :

24

would be that

25

paid within

counsel?

We would

indicate that our desire

it be paid within

60 d a y s .

If it's not

60 d a y s , that a j u d g m e n t be entered and we
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have the ability to execute on that
THE C O U R T :

judgment.

I think in light of the

application of the law here, that 60 days is certainly
not enough time to pay that.
anticipated

I don't know what the

d e f i c i e n c y would be under the order of the

Court.
MR. E Y R E :
THE C O U R T :
MR. E Y R E :
THE C O U R T :

A little over

2,000.

Pardon me?
A little over
I'll

$2,000.

give him twelve months to

pay that, c o u n s e l .
MR. A N D E R S O N :
Honor.

I keep -- that's fine, your

And I hate to keep bringing up

additional

questions.
THE C O U R T :
this.

We might as well resolve all of

That's what our discussion
MR. A N D E R S O N :

clarify

it in my m i n d .

is about.

I guess I'm
The March

just trying

10th order

him to pay -- p r o v i d e the insurance

—

required

w e l l , I guess

I'd have to get my -- there was a certain amount
out in the order for child support.
can find the

set

Let's see if we

order,

THE C O U R T :
was recorded

to

I have it before me.

Actually it

on M a r c h the 11th of 1994.

MR. A N D E R S O N :

And the order was that he pay
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ADDENDUM NO. 4

DEXTER L. ANDERSON, #0084
Attorney at Law
Star Route Box 52
750 South Highway 99
Fillmore, Utah 84631
(801) 743-6522
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAREN MARIE BRADFORD,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.

:

WILLIAM RICHARD BRADFORD,
Defendant.

:
:

STATE OFTEXAS

)

County of

)ss.
)

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
IN RE CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION MODIFICATION

Civil No. 8677

I, William R. Bradford, II, being first duly sworn depose and say that I am the
Defendant in the above-entitled matter, that I am competent to testify herein if called, and that
the following matters are within my personal knowledge or belief.
1.

I am submitting this affidavit pursuant to the order of this Court dated March

10, 1994, modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
2.

Following the hearing in this case on February 16, 1994,1 was re-employed by

1

Bechtel on or about February 22, 1994, on a temporary assignment.
3.

Based on my first week's pay ending February 27, 1994, I received gross pay

totaling $875.76. Out of that gross pay $70.28 was deducted for health insurance and $4.80 was
deducted for dental insurance.
4.

Monthly gross pay equals $3,794.96 and monthly health and dental cost for

Kristyn and Katelynn Bradford is therefore $325.35 per month.
5.

I have investigated health and dental plans available through my employment

with Bechtel since the hearing in this case, and I have determined the following facts;
a)

Bechtel offer a three tier premium schedule which charges a set premium

for;
i)

Employee only

ii)

Employee plus one dependent.

iii)

Employee plus two or more dependents. (Family Coverage)
(See exhibit A attached hereto)

6.

In order to provide insurance for Kristyn and Katelynn Bradford, my two

daughters herein, I am required to enroll under the third option above. Bechtel provides the
insurance on myself as employee, and in order to have Kristyn, added March 31, 1987, and
Katelynn, added March 21, 1989, to my insurance plan, I am required to have the employee
plus two plan that results in the deduction from my gross pay recited above. According to the
rules of the plan it matters not how many over two are also listed on the plan. Therefore, I
2

added ray wife Barbara Bradford to the family plan on July 9, 1993. An adult child of mine
by a previous marriage, Ricki Bradford, is apparently still listed but she is not eligible for any
benefits under the insurance because of her age.
DATED this

W

day of

4P<C- C

, 1994.

WILLIAM R. BRADFORD, II
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1994.

Ml

day of

&

y.

lotary Public

Apr\
vAJ/r
frYUS)

LINDA H. STANISLO
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF MARYLAND
My Commission Expires November 30, 1997

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT IN RE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION MODIFICATION, postage
prepaid, United States Mail, on the_
_dayof_
1994, to the following:
DONALD J. EYRE JR.
Attorney at Law
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
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Bechtef
Qmwatiurg, Maryland 2C678-&386
(301)4174000

March 2 1 , IS94

Mr. William R. Bradford, II
€09 Jacia Court
Burleson, TX 76028
Dear Mr* Bradford,
This LB to confirm our conversation regarding the exact dates of
medical plan'enrollments of your dependents, The enrollment
dates are as follows!
Ricki L. Bradford
Xriatyn M, Bradford
Katelynn Bradford
KBTBn M, Bradford
Barbara A, Bradford

Bnrolled
Bnrolled
Bnrolled
Bnrolled
Bnrolled

09-12-86
03-31-87
03-21-89
05-08-86
07-19-93

Still listed on plan
'Still listed on plan
Still listed on plan
Cancelled 08-31-91
Still listed on plan

You have had fatally coverage (this means employee plus two or
more dependents) continuously since dependent, Ricki, was added
in September of 1986, Bechtel'e medical plan has a three tier
premium schedule which charge* a set premium for "employee only",
"employee plus one dependent", or "employee plua two or more
dependent0".
If you should need more information regarding coverage for your
dependents, please let me knew.
very truly youra,

Brenda A, Kiener
Human Resource* Administrator
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAREN M. BRADFORD

Ruling on Defendant's Objection to
Proposed Order

Plaintiff;

CASE NO. 8677

vs.
WILLIAM R. BRADFORD II,

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
Defendant

Counsel for plaintiff submitted an Order Amending Order Modifying Judgment and
Decree of Divorce based upon this court's ruling at a hearing conducted on November 9,
1994, Counsel for defendant filed "Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order".
I
Discussion
The court has carefully considered the proposed Order and Defendant's Objection to
Proposed Order. The fact of the matter is that the second hearing in this case was necessary
because of defendant's material misrepresentations to the court tinder oalh at the first hearing.
Because defendant was not present at the second hearing, the court was not able to inquire
and determine whether those material misrepresentations were occasioned through negligence,
gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive this court. It is the position of this
court that but for the misrepresentation and perhaps deceit, the post July 1994 hearing
respecting these issues would not have been necessary.
This court found, at the post July hearing, through extensive proffer, that the
insurance arrangement of defendant with his employer was materially and substantially
different than that represented in the pre-July hearing.
Ruling
1. The argument contained in defendant's objection to paragraph 6 of the proposed
order is rejected.
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2. Defendant's argument in his paragraph No- 2 is rejected. This argument was
exhausted at hearing.
3. Defendant's argument in paragraph No.l 3 was exhausted and rejected at hearing.
Accordingly, the court will execute the proposed order as tendered by counsel for
plaintiff.
Dated this /*?day of January, 1995.
BY THE COURT

/ L Y N N W. DAVIS, JUDGE
cc: Juab County Atty
Dexter Anderson, Esq.

